Battle for Ukraine's Cities
Almost exactly 30 years after Bosnian Serbs began shelling Sarajevo, large European cities are once again being besieged. Sarajevo survived - but can Kharkiv, Mariupol and Kyiv?
It took a trip to Sarajevo this week, the epicentre of Europe's last bloody war, to bring home to me what the Ukrainians are up against in the battle to hang on to their cities.
I first drove into the Bosnian capital, alone and at 80mph, shortly after that conflict started in 1992, as the sound of shelling and machine-gun fire echoed off the hills.
I was young and naïve but yearning to understand how war - something I only knew from history books and the family dinner table - could break out on European soil.
Back then Serbs were in the hills and had the city surrounded. Each day they poured artillery and sniper fire into the metropolis below where residents sprinted, jogged and ducked behind buildings in what became known as the Sarajevo shuffle.
At the beginning of the war the Serbs had huge advantage in firepower. But they lacked the numbers, and perhaps the stomach, to try and take the Bosnian capital in street-to-street fighting.
Instead they sat back and used artillery and mortars. Snipers took to high buildings near the city centre and gunned down men, women and children. "Some snipers wanted to hit a child, they felt that it showed off their skill as marksmen," a Bosnian Serb confided in me this week with disgust.
The Serbs probably believed - as the Russians do today - that the residents would soon become desperate and surrender.
Three and a half years later the besiegers finally gave up. Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian strongman, signed a peace deal with his Croat and Muslim counterparts, and the war ended.
There are crucial differences, however, for Ukrainian cities trying to hold out today.
For one there is not the threat of Nato air strikes hanging over the Russians, something the Serbs had to factor in, at least during the last several months of the siege of Sarajevo.
More significantly the Russians have much bigger guns, many more rockets, and superiority in the air.
The Yugoslav National Army - and the Bosnian Serb Army that inherited some of its military hardware - essentially used the same Soviet tactics as the Russians did in Berlin in 1945 and Grozny in 2000. But there was a marked difference in scale.
I heard once - and find it impossible to verify now - that the Russians dropped more ordnance on Grozny, the capital of rebellious Chechnya, in one day than the Bosnian Serbs did on Sarajevo during the entire siege.
I visited Grozny several times between 2002 and 2004 and it seemed plausible.
The only thing I ever saw with my own eyes that even came close to Grozny in terms of devastation was Vukovar, a small riverside town in Croatia flattened by Serbian guns in 1991, and east Mostar, pulverised by the Croats during a cross-town war with the Muslims in 1993.
Destruction is at the heart of the Russian military doctrine and now bodes ill for those defending their homes in Ukraine.
Many Ukrainians have been buoyed by the sight of their young men signing up to fight the Russians street-by-street using Kalashnikov assault rifles and Molotov cocktails.
But those volunteers may struggle to get near enough a Russian tank or soldier to even use their weapons.
After the initial realisation that their forces were not going to be greeted with flowers - something Moscow seemed to have talked itself into - the Russian army is trying to pound cities into submission with rockets, bombs and artillery.
Cold and hunger will be their allies as power and water is cut off and food and medicines run short.
This tactic worked in Aleppo in northern Syria. And it also worked in Grozny against the Chechen rebels, some of the most battle-hardened guerrilla fighters in the world.
Most invading armies - especially when they want to hold and govern terrain and not just eviscerate their enemies - cannot afford such tactics.
In Afghanistan the Americans and their allies committed themselves to a counter-insurgency doctrine which meant that they had to go eyeball-to-eyeball with the Taliban to avoid inflicting civilian casualties. And even then many innocents died.
By keeping the infantry back and using rockets and bombs, the Kremlin will also be looking to lessen the psychological toll on its own soldiers.
Putin has been telling the Russians for months that the Ukrainians are their brothers. Killing them in their thousands, then, will be more palatable for the perpetrators if it can be done at a distance.
For the residents of Sarajevo the siege was devastating and more than 10,000 died, the vast majority of them Muslims. But it was possible to survive in the scarred city.
Unfortunately for those hunkered down in Ukraine's urban centres the intensity of the Russian attack may not be survivable.
Putin sees weakness as a fatal flaw in a Russian leader and it is hard to imagine he will simply give up and go home.
Negotiations are not completely out-of-the-question and if a Russian Spetsnaz team - more about Spetsnaz in a later edition of my newsletter - manage to find and kill President Volodymyr Zelensky Ukraine may yet sue for peace.
If not, and the Russians continue to face stiff resistance they could even decide to go nuclear - literally. In their armoury are short-range tactical nuclear weapons designed to devastate infrastructure and buildings.
Either way the acrimony and hatred that the Russian tactics have already engendered will probably sow the seeds of their own eventual defeat.
Putin may have crushed Chechnya, a republic of one million people, with such methods, but holding down a 45-million strong European country is a challenge of a different magnitude.
Furthermore if most Ukrainians were once moderately pro-Russian, the majority now hate Putin and Moscow.
Ironically the most successful tactics of recent times against a large invading army has been to not put up any resistance at all.
The Afghans, who have this down to a fine art, welcome the invader in and then persuade them to hand over aid and financial support.
It is only after the initial weeks and months when the occupier has exposed his soft underbelly that the sniping, roadside bombs and ambushes begin to pick up pace and the invader begins to slowly bleed. It took the Afghans 10 years to oust the Soviets and 20 the Americans, but they prevailed.
It may not be the European way of fighting a war but it worked against the world's two most powerful armies.
Unfortunately the fighting in Ukraine and the horrible humanitarian toll it is causing, looks set to get worse in the short term. But beyond that it is difficult to see how Putin, soon to be a septuagenarian, can come out of it with anything other than a loss.
We just have to hope that it doesn't take three-and-a-half years for him to realise that. And that - facing such a loss - he does not decide to reap even greater devastation both in Ukraine and beyond.
Fully agree with you core analysis. I was confused why Putin ever thought the Russian Army could do this. They have only ever let him down and the proportion of conscripts may have changed but the quality is little changed from Chechnya. Indeed I would assume most of the better officers left in the Chechnya period leaving the present crowd of generals. Still since 2008 he gave the generals lots of money so they had little choice but to agree they could do this. He for some reason believed them. In Chechnya even after they had completed the bombardment it took a long time to assemble 42 MRD to get Grozny fully controlled. Ukraine is a much bigger task. It remains low probability but if the bombardment fails to dislodge eg Kyiv and if the Army falls apart which it might, Putin might well reach for tactical nuclear and thermobaric weapons. For the next few months Putin's actions in Ukraine look somewhat predictable. The bigger uncertainty is western reaction. We may think we are not at War with Russia but I strongly suspect Putin thinks we are; sanctions and weapons supply. At a min he will try some cyber attacks. A Times poll today shows their readers roughly split between stay out and sort this out - all very vague and unreliable. But still will western leaders who understand escalation risks be prepared to hold firm in the face of The Something Must be Done advocates while Putin levels Ukrainian towns? I doubt it and that is where the risks of escalation comes from.
At what point might president zelensky prove more effective by leaving the country and being the voice of the opposition from a neighboring country rather like de Gaulle leaving France for London after the fall of France? Or do you think his greatest contribution is to remain in Ukraine at the risk of being captured and silenced?